corruption, social cohesion, and economic performance largely went unaddressed. Iushchenko, however, left a more discernable legacy in regards to politics of memory, some of it highly controversial, such as the decision to rehabilitate the legacy of Ukrainian radical nationalism of the 1930s and '40s.
Shukhevych was not the first radical nationalist to be reassessed by Iushchenko; in May, 2007 he issued a presidential edict to honor the memory of Iaroslav Stets'ko , who led the oun(b) [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] , and his wife Iaroslava (1920 Iaroslava ( -2003 who eventually succeeded her husband as leader of the oun(b) in 1991-2003.5 The couple were glorified in mass media; streets, squares, and buildings were renamed after them, a museum in their honor was to be established in Kyiv.6 After losing the first round of the 2010 presidential elections, Iushchenko in January, 2010 posthumously elevated oun(b) leader Stepan Bandera ) to a national 'Hero of Ukraine,' triggering an intense debate on the legacy of the oun.7 The 'Bandera debate' took place at a dramatic junction in Ukrainian politics, as Iushchenko did not make it to the second round of the elections, and Ukrainians elected Viktor Ianukovych (b. 1950) and his Party of Regions to lead the country.8 As it is the name and person of Bandera, rather than Shukhevych that has come to be most intimately linked with Ukrainan radical nationalism, the 'Bandera debate' eventually came to eclipse the controversy surrounding the elevation of Shukhevych to national hero. At the time, however, this was a major symbolic event which polarized public opinion and sharply divided supporters and opponents of the decision, and, unlike previous controversial choices became a matter of international attention and protests. The award ceremony for Shukhevych was preceded by a march of upa veterans through Kyiv. Shukhevych's son Iuryi, the leader of the far-right paramilitary organization una-unso, accepted the medal on his father's behalf.9 Uniformed members of this, and other radical right-wing groups, dressed in brown shirts and black ties joined the upa veterans. Far from becoming a dignified, solemn manifestation of a nation united behind the late upa commander, the march degenerated into street brawls between octogenarian veterans of the Red Army and upa, as well as between radical nationalists and protesters from the communist and progressive socialist parties.10 The small Ukrainian Jewish community was outraged.11 Speaking to a meeting of upa veterans, Iushchenko stated that 'The memory of each hero and every victim of the struggle for Ukraine's liberation, freedom, and independence is sacred and undivisible . . . . Let us not avoid any difficult pages of our history and in such a way let us restore the truth which is based on the Ukrainian nation's great exploits -the exploits of the people who defeated death and established their state. '12 Against this backdrop, the credibility of Iushchenko's words about the establishment of historical 'truth' and an indivisible national memory was limited among many Ukrainians. Rather than promoting national reconciliation, the government's attempts to turn Shukhevych into a national hero opened up old wounds and exposed deep divisions in Ukrainian society -between the right and left, east and west, and between Ukrainian nationalists and representatives of the Jewish community.13 Given Iushchenko's expressed ambition of orienting Ukraine towards membership in the European Union and nato, his designation of ultranationalist collaborators with Nazi Germany as national heroes paradoxically put some of his interpretations of history more at odds with the European mainstream than even Ianukovych and his pro-Russian electorate in the east.14 As Iushchenko and the western parts of Ukraine celebrated the centennial of Shukhevych's birth, the Kharkiv City Assembly, dominated by Ianukovych's Party of Regions, called on the public to stop glorifying the memories of oun and fascism 5 (2016) 26-65 upa.15 The Party of Regions described Shukhevych's award as an endorsement of integral nationalism and as an attack on the peoples of eastern Ukraine: 'the population of the non-western areas of Ukraine feel an ever stronger ideological pressure from the brand of Banderite Nazism and xenophobia.'16 In the Verkhovna Rada, Ukrainian Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko (b. 1952), an ally of Ianukovych, protested 'the raising to sainthood today of one who received two Iron Crosses from the hands of Hitler with his order to celebrate his 100th anniversary at an official level.'17 Another high-profile communist, Oleksandr Holub, condemned the move as part of 'the president's attempts to impose pro-fascist, neo-Nazi policy on society.'18 After UkrainianCanadian political scientist Petro Potichnyj (b. 1930), a former child soldier of the upa and a leading authority on the history of his movement, refuted Symonenko's claims,19 the president of the Ukrainian World Congress responded by suing Symonenko for libel.20
oun and upa
Iushchenko's ambition of building national myths around the oun was controversial. Founded in 1929, the oun was the largest and most important Ukrainian far-right organization. Explicitly totalitarian, the movement embraced the Führerprinzip, a cult of political violence, racism, and an aggressive antiSemitism.21 It sought the establishment of Ukrainian statehood at any price, Prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union, German military intelligence set up two small Ukrainian formations: Sonderformation Nachtigall, and Organisation Roland. Formed in Cracow on March, 2, 1941, the Nachtigall battalion consisted mostly of Ukrainian Nationalists. Established for the purpose of the immanent attack on the Soviet Union, its members received their training at Neuhammer, Silesia. Its volunteers bore German uniforms and weapons, and were attached to the 1st Battalion of the Regiment Brandenburg-800.35 Shukhevych not only became the highest-ranking Ukrainian officer in the Nachtigall battalion; he also enjoyed the greatest standing among its Ukrainian members.
In the field, Nachtigall was a mixed unit with three companies, each made up of one German platoon and two Ukrainian platoons. A fourth company appears to have been employed in small groups elsewhere. All Ukrainian officers had German doubles, in the case of Shukhevych, it was Theodore Oberländer .36 Shukhevych, as the ranking Ukrainian, probably conveyed battalion orders to the Ukrainian men of the unit. He received the orders from Hans Albrecht Herzner (d. 1942), Nachtigall's military commander. Herzner, in turn, took his orders from the leadership of the First Battalion of Regiment 800. When the unit was rounded out with Herzner and the German platoons, Oberländer served as liaison between Nachtigall and Regiment 800 on one hand, and between Nachtigall and Abwehr ii Headquarters in Cracow (before the invasion) and the military intelligence department of Army Group South ( following the invasion).
Shukhevych's role was that of a courier of orders and a company commander. He was an efficient, but harsh officer, who did not hesitate to use physical violence against his own men.37 Nachtigall participated in the invasion of the One of its former members, Viktor Kharkiv (Khmara) described physical abuse at the hands of Shukhevych after having gone to the barber without Shukhevych's explicit permission. 'He attacked me on the spot, asked me how I could have managed to get out, depite the curfew regarding leaving the sealed-off area around the casern. I began explaining that I had only been to the barber. Captain Shukhevych did not listen to that and punched me in the face.' TsDAVO Ukrainy, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 57, ark. 18.
Soviet Union in June, 1941, and took part in the capture of L'viv, Zolochiv, Ternopil' and Vinnytsia.38 Before retreating from the advancing German forces, the nkvd massacred many of the inmates it held in prisons across western Ukraine.39 Among the thousands of people murdered was Shukhevych's brother.40 The nkvd murders radicalized local sentiment, and was instrumentalized by the German forces and local nationalists to incite violent anti-Jewish pogroms. Roman Shukhevych personally helped set up the Ukrainian nationalist militia, which played a key role in the L'viv pogrom.41 Soldiers of Nachtigall partook in the independence led to a conflict with the leadership of the Nachtigall battalion. On August 13, 1941, it was disarmed and ordered to return from Vinnytsia to Neuhammer in Silesia, from which its members were transported to Frankfurt an der Oder.
Shukhevych in Belarus
On On the shooting of Jews in the Vinnytsia area, Nachtigall member Viktor Kharkiv (Khmara) later wrote 'At the time of our march eastwards we saw with our own eyes the victims of the Judeo-Bolshevik terror, and the sight of it so strengthened our hatred of the Jews, that in two villages we shot all the Jews we encountered. I recall one example. At the time of our march through one village we saw many vagrant people. Asked where they were going, they answered that the Jews were threatening them and that they were afraid of spending the night in their houses. 
From Schutzmannschaften into the upa
As the German Sixth Army was getting trapped in Stalingrad, the oun(b) leadership was forced to reassess the situation, and was slowly abandoning its proGerman orientation, as Tarik Amar has noted, 'at first reluctantly and never completely.'64 'As long as the struggle against the Soviets continued, the oun-B argued, "our political reason tells us to bide our tine," meaning to avoid confrontation with the Germans. In the pro-nationalist rendering of history, the OUN's collaboration with Nazi Germany, the anti-Jewish pogroms, and the massacres of the Polish minority in Volhynia and eastern Galicia are ignored, glossed over, or outright denied. The period from August, 1941, to January, 1943, is either downplayed or omitted from most Shukhevych biographies, the focus instead being heavily centered on Shukhevych's role, from 1943 until his death in 1950, as commander of the upa, the largest armed national resistance in the Soviet Union. Shukhevych's defiant resistance to Stalinism has a powerful appeal to the patriotic imagination of many Ukrainians, particularly in the western part of the country. However, as Shukhevych was turned into an official hero of Ukraine and the organization he led presented as representing the Ukrainian people, questions also emerged in regards to the 'missing years,'omitted from the hagiographies.
The Volume 10 of the New Series of Litopys upa is a little more elaborate, alluding to atrocities in Belarus, but that Shukhevych managed to maintain human decency:
The struggle against the partisans in Belarus was difficult and exhausting, and the laurels of victory did not fall to either the Germans or their allies, including the soldiers of the Ukrainian police battalion. According to V. Ianiv, 'this was a horrible time' in Shukhevych's life, who was forced 'to play the role of the Germans' friend to the last minute' although 'his heart was breaking from pain.' Myroslav Kal'ba recalls that Shukhevych and other Ukrainian commanders sought to avoid taking part in the Nazis' educational networks. From around 1980, they started to refer to themselves as a diaspora, rather than as émigrés. punitive actions against the local population and tried to evade the food requisitions, declaring 'that we were sent here to fight, not loot.' In taking direct part in battles against the Belarusian partisans and studying the Nazis' anti-partisan operations, Shukhevych not only acquired combat experience but also absorbed the rules of partisan warfare. In our opinion, he became one of the finest adepts of this specific form of armed struggle in the ranks of the Ukrainian liberation movement.87 Mykola Posivnych's introduction to volume 45 concisely articulates the traditional diaspora view:
Roman Shukhevych occupies an exceptional place in the twentieth century pantheon of Ukraine's national warriors. He was one of the organizers of the struggle against all occupiers of Ukraine . . . .The life and deeds of the commander in chief of the upa, Brigadier-General Roman Shukhevych -'Taras Chuprynka' -are a shining example of the heroic struggles for Ukrainian statehood and should serve as a model to be emulated by future generations of Ukrainians.88
Shukhevych is referred to as 'a beacon that shows the path for the young generation,' and his service in Belarus as 'a great example of heroic character, the highest ethical values, national honor, and Christian morality.'89
Shukhevych as Hero on the Silver Screen
Iziaslav Kokodniak, writing in the nationalist newspaper Za vil'nu Ukrainu in 2000, argued that the Ukrainian people needs to be nationally conscious, and that the Ukrainian state must become national in content. He explicitly called for the dissemination of 'nationalist myths' to counter Soviet myths on the crimes of upa. Nationalist organizations, according to Kokodniak, must 87 Kentii a genteel family man forced by brutal circumstances and his own sense of duty to lead the fight to deliver his people from the savageries of both the Nazis and Soviets . . . . Yanchuk explores the complex character of Shukhevych, his revulsion at ethnic discrimination, his love of music, his genius in combat. The film smolders with the passion of the man and ignites that viewer with the same fire that Shukhevych fueled in his countrymen -the unquenchable flame of freedom . . . . It is a personal story of faith and commitment and ultimately, the victory over tyranny.91
Ianchuk portrays Shukhevych as a valiant hero, something of a combination of George Washington and James Bond: a remarkably handsome man, always surrounded by young, attractive females, yet ever faithful to his wife and family. Shukhevych's attitude to the Germans is portrayed as defiant, even domineering. His German superiors tremble in his presence, speaking in a soft and hesitant voice, avoiding eye contact as Shukhevych, in a loud voice demands the release of Bandera and declares his loyalty to Ukraine, not Hitler or Germany. This is followed by a battle scene in which the hero overpowers his German captors on a train, and discreetly departs into the majestic nature of the Carpathian Mountains just as the leaves are turning. The viewer gets the impression of a clean break with the Germans in the fall of 1941 and that Shukhevych thereafter pursued an active armed resistance against both the Nazis and the Soviets. The hero dramatically sheds his German uniform as a voice announces in first person: 'I left the Wehrmacht, earlier than we had anticipated. The oun went into the deep underground. The Hitlerite terror forced the leadership to establish self-defense forces. Thus, the Insurgent Army developed into a regular army.' The movie then makes a hefty jump forward in the chronology. The period between July, 1941, to August, 1943, during which the bulk of the Ukrainian Jews were murdered and the fortunes of the Germans turned, are simply omitted. Left out are also upa's massacres of tens of thousands of Volhynian Poles during the summer of 1943, while Shukhevych headed the organization.92 The viewer is re-introduced to the historical narrative only in autumn of 1943. The upa is presented as an inclusive, multi-ethnic organization. The hero reminds the viewers that ethnic minorities, such as Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Jews, and Kazakhs were allowed in the upa.93
Nationalist assessments of Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201
More research is needed in order to establish the exact role and whereabouts of the 201st Battalion and its activities. Older pro-oun/pro-upa accounts tend to overlook or ignore the period between August 1941 and January 1943 entirely.94 Recent accounts either diminish the importance of his whereabouts in 1942, or portray Shukhevych's presence in Belarus as a benign tutorial in patriotism for the Belarusian population, an opportunity for them to advance the relatively underdeveloped Belarusian national consciousness.95 They also deny that there were any 'real' partisans in Belarus at this point, or, alternatively, that there were civilian victims of the activities of the Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201. 'In Belarus, the members of the battalion strived to help the local population in any way they could -even though it was strictly forbidden,' wrote mercilessly, purposely provoking the German Army and their Polish allies into harsh punitive actions . . . . During its nine-month protective assignment the officers and soldiers of the Legion took every chance to work to enhance the national consciousness of the local population and to implant a conviction that a free and prosperous life is possible only in a powerful, independent state. With that aim the officers and the instructors provided specialized education for hundreds of young Belarusians, preparing them for struggle, not only against the Russian-Bolshevik invaders. This could not be talked about openly. Yet, the Ukrainian legionnaires were able to rescue many Belarusian patriots, supporters of state independence from both the Gestapo, and the mgb, which operated under the auspices of Bolshevik partisans. There were many such cases, when such people were able to engage [the local Belarusians] in serious battles or assist them through powerful military support.97
Memory Management
Under President Iushchenko, most Ukrainian textbooks came to present Shukhevych in a very favorable light. 'Relentlessly and almost infallibly, the oun and the upa are portrayed as victims and not perpetrators,' writes Swedish historian Johan Dietsch. and intellectuals, from both before and after the breakout of the war.107 After Stalingrad, the oun leadership systematically manipulated the organization's past. Original documents were retyped, pro-German and anti-Semitic statements omitted, sensitive documents withheld or released selectively, producing a distortingly selective view, which avoided thorny and compromising issues.108 V'iatrovych uncritically relied on the nationalists' own doctored accounts while dismissing emerging scholarship as Soviet propaganda. Avoiding the sensitive issues in Shukhevych's biography, he instead focused on the work of the KGB of the Ukrainian ssr to discredit the oun, 109 In an open letter to Iushchenko, Roman Krutsyk, the chairman of the Kyiv Memorial Society requested the Ukrainian president to obtain all incriminating documents for the Ukrainian sbu and the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory so that the Ukrainian researchers can ascertain their authenticity. He complained that Israel was pushed into an anti-Ukrainian stance by Russia, and expressed his concern that 'Israel does not want to recognize the Holodomor120 In Belarus the 201st Ukrainian battalion was not concentrated in one place, as it was protecting bridges over the rivers Biarezina and Dzvina. The detachments in the small villages were also assigned to protect the local German administration. Towards the end of November 1942 the Ukrainian officers decided to maximally curtail the battalions' active participation in German military actions in order to avoid further losses. On December 1, 1942 the soldiers of the battalion refused to renew the contract with the Germans, which led to the arrest of many of them, particularly their leaders. Others, including Roman Shukhevych, were able to escape. All together, many soldiers of the battalion joined the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, where they, as well-prepared soldiers, chose to take up commanding positions. In the functions of that army, defending the Ukrainian population, they fought honorably against their former allies, the Germans.124
On the question why Shukhevych did not immediately turn his weapons against the Germans after they had lied to him and arrested the leadership of the oun, V'iatrovych responded: The disagreements regarding Shukhevych's whereabouts in 1942 concern not only the interpretations of the events, but also about basic facts surrounding the German occupation of Belarus. Shukhevych's critics portray him as a war criminal; his admirers either overlook this episode or regard his collaboration with Nazi Germany as unproblematic.
Conclusion
Independence has called for a re-evaluation of Ukrainian history. As the polarized discussions regarding the legacy of Shukhevych and other oun leaders show, this process is not without its difficulties. At the heart of this discussion lies the question of what sort of society Ukraine should be, its geopolitical orientation, and what sort of 'national heroes' and role models this society needs. Some commentators have argued that the glorification of the leaders of the oun and upa does not mean rehabilitation of their ideology:
One piece of good news, however, is that attempts to rehabilitate oun and upa followers as freedom fighters and glorify their leaders as national heroes, are not accompanied by attempts to revive the ideology of integral nationalism or promote any kind of militancy and intolerance. The emphasis typically is put on ethical rather than ideological values. The upa fighters . . . are praised first of all for their patriotism and commitment to the national-liberation cause, for their idealism and dedication, for spiritual strength and self-sacrifice. We see here the makings of a heroic myth to counterbalance the long-dominant image of the impeccable Red Army. Any nation invents some historical myths of the sort, and we can only hope that every nation will be able to keep the irrational energy of its historical myths under rational control.133
A historian may object that this sort of semi-mythical, moral tales of the exploits of 'national liberators' belongs in the nineteenth, rather than the twentyfirst century, and that the role of the professional historian is to be to facilitate the understanding of the past rather than producing edifying patriotic myths, using the organs of state security. The professional historian would also raise the question of whether it is possible to turn Shukhevych into a national hero without legitimizing the ideology of the organizations he led.
'Ukraine for Ukrainians' was implemented as brutal policy. Members of both wings of the oun engaged in pogroms in 1941 and ethnic cleansing in 1943, in the ranks of the Wehrmacht, the Ukrainian police in occupied Ukraine, the upa and Waffen-ss Galizien. The ideology of the oun(b) was not static. Yet, at the same time as the oun(b) officially moderated its political positions in the summer of 1943, the upa was systematically massacring the Polish population of Volhynia, expanding the ethnic cleansing to eastern Galicia in 1944. 134 While Bandera himself remained a committed anti-democrat until his death at the hands of a Soviet assassin in 1959, the organization went through periods when its totalitarianism was toned down. 135 The nationalistic accounts tend to focus on what has been done to Ukrainians and not by them. 136 In the quest for victim status it is easily forgotten that Ukrainians were found not only among the victims, but also among the perpetrators of the totalitarian regimes.137 Referring to this phenomenon as 'the nationalism of the victim,' Timothy Garton Ash notes that the focus on the suffering of one's own group often comes at the expense of the interest taken in the suffering of others, that it is linked to 'a reluctance to acknowledge in just measure the sufferings of other peoples, an inability to admit that the victim can also victimize.'138 Günther Grass -of all people -referred to the uneven and selective approach of dealing with the past as 'disabled memory. '139 fascism 5 (2016) 26-65
Much as both sides in the controversy squabbled over caricatures which are a legacy of Soviet and nationalist propaganda, the designation of Shukhevych as a national hero is best understood as continuing this tradition. Ironically, the controversy took place at a time when recent scholarship raised very serious question about the suitability of the oun and upa as symbols of an aspiring democracy. Rather than more myth making, Ukrainian society may arguably be better served by critical inquiry and critical engagement with the difficult episodes of it recent past.
